DOI: https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2020-2-192-202
The status of qualia in naturalistic theories of consciousness
Ekaterina V. Uskova
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Associate Professor of the Department
of Personnel Management and Psychology
Ural Federal University named after
the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin,
19, Mira st., Ekaterinburg, 620002, Russia;
e-mail: uskova80@mail.ru
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4531-7285
The article analyzes naturalistic theories of consciousness in the framework of analytical philosophy. The choice of these theories is due to the monistic interpretation of consciousness in them. This position seems, on the one hand, to be logically sound, and, on the other hand, to have sufficient explanatory power. However, there are weaknesses in this position, some of which are considered in the article. One of the obvious difficulties for any theory of consciousness, especially the naturalistic one, is the interpretation of qualia or the qualitative scope of our mental states. Scientists are faced with such questions as: «Why does it even exist?» and «What is its practical meaning?» We find possible answers to them in the theories of J. Searle, N. Humphrey, and F. Peters. Each of them agrees that consciousness is generated by the brain, but they differ in the interpretation of its ontological status. Nevertheless, their understanding of the epistemic status of consciousness is similar: correlation of views on consciousness from the position of the 3rd and 1st person is always problematic. At the same time, both consciousness itself and its qualitative scope can and should be explained within the framework of the evolutionary approach. It is obvious that none of the naturalistic theories of consciousness has yet given answers to all questions (if it is even possible), but the search for these answers, in our opinion, should be carried out precisely within this approach.
Keywords: analytical philosophy, theory of consciousness, consciousness and the unconscious, qualia, phenomenal consciousness, mental states of consciousness, physicalism, naturalism.
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Received 08.04.2020
For citation:
Uskova E.V. [The status of qualia in naturalistic theories of consciousness]. Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Filosofia. Psihologia. Sociologia [Perm University Herald. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology], 2020, issue 2, pp. 192–202 (in Russian). DOI: https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2020-2-192-202